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I. INTRODUCTION
When the legislature deﬁnes a crime—when it speciﬁes a
punishment for a person shown beyond a reasonable doubt to
have acted in a certain way in certain circumstances and with
certain results—it succeeds in deﬁning a second crime as well,
namely the crime of attempting to commit the crime deﬁned.
The legislature could choose speciﬁcally not to proscribe the
attempt to commit a crime deﬁned, but in the absence of an
explicit statement to that effect, by deﬁning the crime the
legislature grants the state the power to punish also for the
attempt. Why do we have this practice? What problem are we
solving by having a system in which it is automatically a crime
to attempt almost every crime explicitly deﬁned? It is natural
to answer that we are solving a problem of inequality: since
there is no difference in desert between the person who
completes the crime and the person who tries but fails, and
since there is often no other good reason to treat them dif-
ferently, there ought not to be a difference in treatment by the
state. A system that does not punish attempts to commit
crimes treats equally deserving citizens differently and for no
good reason.
To accept this justiﬁcation is to make what many see as a
salutary commitment to the denial of moral luck. Those who
take there to be moral luck, in the sense in which the term is
to be used here, hold that it is possible for two actions to
differ morally in virtue of the fact that they differ in some
respect that was entirely out of the control of the agent of
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either action.1 In fact, the intuitive thought that there can be a
moral diﬀerence between an action, on the one hand, and a failed
attempt to perform the very same action, on the other, is often
cited as support for the contention that some moral intuitions
point towards the existence of moral luck.2 After all, often the
diﬀerence between succeeding and merely trying is nothing but a
diﬀerence in the air currentswafting throughdiﬀerent parts of the
casino. Yet, it seems intuitively that this diﬀerence can make a
moral diﬀerence. So, it is no surprise that those who take the
intuition to be ﬂawed also think that the point of criminalizing
attempts is, precisely, to correct for the inﬂuence of this ﬂawed
intuition in our legal system. People who take this line are also
disturbed by the sentencing practices that we ﬁnd in many
jurisdictions, practices which seem to involve a commitment to
moral luck. Many jurisdictions provide lesser penalties for at-
tempted crimes than for completed; under the common law, for
instance, an attempted felony is a misdemeanor.3 In response, a
number of theorists,4 and the drafters of theModel Penal Code,5
1 Thus, for the purposes of this paper, my concern is with moral luck as it
applies to the assessment of actions, and not to the assessment of agents,
except in so far as assessment of actions is a form of assessment of agents. My
concern then is not with so called ‘‘constitutive’’ luck: luck that inﬂuences
what sort of person an agent is. My concern is, however, with ‘‘consequen-
tial’’ luck and, to some degree, with ‘‘opportunity’’ luck.What one does often
depends both on what consequences ﬂow from what one does and on what
opportunities one had to act. If either can make an action morally worse or
better, even when the consequence or opportunity is out of the agents con-
trol, then there is moral luck.
2 Cf. Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck in Mortal Questions, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 24–38.
3 States use various methods for calculating the sentence for an attempt,
but most oﬀer a lesser penalty for the attempt than for the completed crime.
California, for instance, gives half the penalty of the completed crime for the
attempted (see Cal. Penal Code §664). This remains the most common
formula.
4 See, for instance, Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck
of the Draw in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 84 (4), 1994, pp.
679–702; Stephen Morse, Reasons, Results and Criminal Responsibility in
U. Ill. L. Rev. 363, 2004, pp. 364–435.
5 Model Penal Code, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1985,
Part 1, commentary on §5.05, p. 490.
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have claimed there to be no adequate justiﬁcation for a discrep-
ancy between sentences for attempted and completed crimes, and
they have done so on the grounds that there is no moral luck and
so often no diﬀerence in moral culpability between those who try
and fail, on the one hand, and those who succeed in committing a
crime, on the other. Such theorists accept the justiﬁcation above
for the proscription of attempts: such a proscription corrects for
morally irrelevant luck and so moves us a step closer to a system
in which equally deserving citizens are treated the same. This
justiﬁcation, they think, should also be reﬂected in our sentencing
practices.
If we accept this justiﬁcation for our practice of criminalizing
attempts, then we ought not to allow the way in which we
criminalize attempts to simply reintroduce the problem of
inequality that criminalizing attempts was meant to solve. That
is, we ought not to allow that there are those who do less than
attempt a crime and who do not differ morally from those who
attempt it, and who are for no good reason nonetheless treated
differently by the state from those who attempt. If attempt law
allows for this, then we would ﬁnd that proscribing attempts
solves a problem only by reintroducing the very same problem.
And, in fact, it appears (although, as will be argued here, merely
appears) that attempt law does allow for this in an objection-
able way. The crime of attempt requires an act; there is no
attempted crime if the defendant has not done something to
further his criminal intention. But what act an agent performs
is, often, at least partially a matter of luck. This point is often,
and naturally, countered with the following platitude: an act on
the part of the defendant is an essential element of attempt for
evidential reasons. The thought is that acts, and nothing other
than acts, constitute evidence of the thing that we really care to
criminalize when we criminalize attempts, such as a criminal
intention, disposition, or a resolute determination to act crim-
inally. In what follows, it will be argued that it is very diﬃcult
to ﬂesh out this response satisfactorily. It is very diﬃcult, that
is, to do both of the following two things: (1) deny moral luck
in the way required to support the justiﬁcation just described
for the practice of criminalizing attempts, and (2) adequately
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justify, along the lines suggested by the appeal to the evidential
role of acts, the fact that the crime of attempt requires an act.
Despite the diﬃculties, however, it will be argued that it can be
done. By reﬂecting on the notion of trying to act, we learn that
trying to commit a crime is something that can only be ade-
quately evidenced when the defendant has performed some
actions, actions that he may not have performed were it not for
various events entirely out of his control.
II. THE PROBLEM
In virtually every jurisdiction in the United States, and under
the Model Penal Code,6 to be guilty of an attempt to commit
crime C a defendant must (1) intend to C7,8 and (2) take steps
towards C-ing that (a) go beyond merely preparing to C and (b)
go some distance towards completion of the crime (although
how far one needs to go varies by jurisdiction). In the second of
these two requirements, the law governing attempts reﬂects a
pair of intuitive distinctions, both of which are inordinately
diﬃcult to analyze satisfactorily. To see them, imagine that I
6 See Model Penal Code §5.01(1).
7 I discuss this requirement in a companion to this paper, Trying, Intending
and Attempted Crimes in Philosophical Topics, 32 (1–2), 2004, pp. 505–532.
8 It is a non-trivial matter to specify the content of the intention required
for attempt. It is false to suggest, as I seem to be in the main text in calling
the relevant intention an ‘‘intention to C’’, that the relevant intention must
be an intention to fulﬁll all of the elements of the completed crime. It is not
obvious, to identify just one problem with such a view, that the circum-
stantial elements of the completed crime need to be in the content of the
intention required for attempt. To mention another problem, it is obvious
that the defendant need not intend to commit a crime, that is, to violate a
law; just as the completed crime might require no awareness on the defen-
dants part that he is violating a law, the attempted crime might not require
any such awareness, much less any such intent. In any event, since deter-
mining the content of the needed intention is not my task here, I will use a
variety of possibly misleading phrases, such as ‘‘the intention to C’’, ‘‘the
intention to act criminally’’, and the ‘‘intention to complete the crime’’, to
refer to the required intention. All such phrases should be understood to be
referring to that intention, whatever its content, that is properly an element
of attempt.
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intend to climb a staircase of 100 steps. I tie my shoes. I ascend
the ﬁrst stair, then the second, and so on. There is an intuitive
diﬀerence between tying my shoes and ascending the ﬁrst stair.
The former act is merely preparatory while the latter is a step
towards doing as I intend. There is also an intuitive distinction
between ascending the ﬁrst stair and ascending stairs one
through ﬁfty. The latter act, the act of ascending the ﬁrst ﬁfty
stairs, is more of a step towards doing as I intend than is the
former. So, there is a diﬀerence (possibly of kind, possibly of
degree) between mere preparations and steps, on the one hand,
and a diﬀerence of degree among steps, on the other. Steps are
all distinct from preparations, but some are more substantial
than others. In addition to an intention, the crime of attempt
requires that a defendant took steps and that her steps were
suﬃciently substantial; preparations wont do and neither will
small steps. A guilty defendant took steps towards doing as he
intended and he went far enough to warrant criminal liability.
Criminal lawyers and judges use these two intuitive distinc-
tions, and it is quite possible that they mark genuine joints in
nature between types of actions. Perhaps, that is, it would be
possible to provide criteria for distinguishing between mere
preparations and steps, and provide criteria for determining
when one step is more substantial than another. However, even
if we had such criteria, the distinctions are not, in and of
themselves, normatively useful. To see this, notice, ﬁrst, that the
distinction between mere preparations and steps is normatively
irrelevant: whatever distinguishes steps that are far enough
along to warrant criminal liability from those that are not will
also serve to distinguish steps warranting criminal liability from
mere preparations. If we have, that is, a way of explaining why
taking 50 steps is enough for liability for the ascent of the stairs,
while taking one step is not, then we will also have a way of
explaining why tying my shoes is not enough for criminal lia-
bility; we wont need criteria for distinguishing the tying of the
shoes from the taking of one step. And, further, notice that if
we are able to explain why taking 50 steps warrants criminal
liability, while taking 49 does not, then we would be able to
explain why taking one or two steps does not, even if we cannot
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provide entirely satisfactory criteria for distinguishing the
intuitive difference of degree between taking one step and
taking two. That is, the distinction in degree between taking
one step and taking 50, if it is normatively relevant, will be only
derivatively so; what will really matter normatively is the
question of where to place the threshold. What these points
suggest is that our purposes here will be best served by dividing
the territory a bit differently from the way in which these
intuitive distinctions divide it. I explain.
Consider a broad class of actions that includes both those
actions that we think of intuitively as mere preparations and
those we think of as steps: actions that are believed by the agent
to be necessary means to doing as he intends and are performed
in part at least because of that belief; call that class of actions
‘‘the class of means’’.9 Many actions that an agent performs,
even if required in order to do as he intends, do not belong in
this class. Much that is necessary to successfully climbing the
staircase is not performed by me in part because I believe it to
be so; I cant climb the staircase if I dont breathe, but (without
telling some special story) it doesnt appear that I breathe be-
cause I believe it to be a necessary means to climbing the
staircase, and so breathing is not in the class of means. Simi-
larly, if I stand at the bottom and announce, ‘‘Now I shall
ascend!’’, my report of my intention is not ordinarily made
because I believe it to be a necessary means to climbing the
staircase; reporting my intention is not ordinarily in the class of
means. I do, however, both tie my shoes and ascend the ﬁrst
stair in part because I intend to ascend the staircase and believe
those acts to be necessary to doing as I intend. Now, the nor-
matively signiﬁcant distinction—the distinction we would like
to understand better and which is reﬂected in the law governing
attempts in every jurisdiction—is between actions in the class of
9 By ‘‘necessary means’’ I include acts that are believed by the agent to be
a necessary part of some suﬃcient means, but are not believed to be strictly
necessary. So, for instance, I might think that loading the gun is not strictly
necessary for killing someone, since I could strangle him instead, I might
also think that it is necessary if Im going to kill him by shooting him. In
such a case, the loading of the gun is a member of the class of means.
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means; in particular, some are thought suﬃcient for the act
element of attempt, others are not.
How should the law divide the class of means? This question
has been answered in various ways at various times in the history
of the criminal law and it is answered differently in different
jurisdictions through various well-known ‘‘tests’’ used to deﬁne
the act element of attempt. To give just one example, the ‘‘Last
Act’’ test speciﬁes that any act that is such that no additional acts
are needed for completion of the crime is enough for the act
element of attempt. The ‘‘Last Act’’ test, then, provides a crite-
rion for dividing the class ofmeans into those that are enough for
the act element of attempt and those that are not. For conve-
nience, lets deﬁne the term ‘‘substantial steps’’ to mean ‘‘acts
performed as means to doing as the agent intends and that are
sufﬁcient for the act element of attempt’’, leaving it open, for
now, what test is best for determining when an act in the class of
means is a substantial step, in this sense. In this sense of the term,
throughout the history of the criminal law, and in every juris-
diction, there are two elements of an attempt to commit crime C:
(1) an intention to C, and (2) substantial steps. Well use the term
‘‘insubstantial steps’’ to refer to acts that are members of the
class of means but are insufﬁcient for the act element of attempt.
(In the fourth section of this paper, the question of how to draw
the substantial/insubstantial distinction will be discussed.) By
dividing the territory this way, it is possible to make some
headway in understanding the justiﬁcation for the act element of
attempt without appeal to any distinction, intuitive or otherwise,
between mere preparations and steps.
Now, if we were constructing a law that involved a whole-
hearted rejection of moral luck and a wholehearted commit-
ment to a moral justiﬁcation for punishment, we would want to
deﬁne ‘‘substantial step’’ in such a way as to ensure two things.
First, we would want to deﬁne the notion in such a way that the
difference between the agent who attempts the crime and the
agent who completes it is solely a matter of luck; we would
want the gap between substantial step and completion to be
ﬁlled only by luck. After all, given the rejection of moral luck,
the thought that the attempt and the completed crime are to be
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punished equivalently, together with the thought that punish-
ment is to align with moral culpability, requires that the dif-
ference between them—the difference, that is, between a
substantial step towards success and success itself—is merely
lucky. And, second, we would want to ensure that the differ-
ence between any agent intending to commit the crime who
does not take substantial steps, on the one hand, and an agent
who attempts the crime, on the other, is not merely lucky. After
all, the former is not guilty of criminal attempt, while the latter
has attempted a crime and so is liable to be punished; if we
dont believe in moral luck, and the only diﬀerence between
these two agents is lucky, we are morally required not to treat
them diﬀerently, contrary to what the law requires.
In fact, it is very difﬁcult (although, as this paper will estab-
lish, not impossible) for a substantial step to be deﬁned in a way
that meets these two strictures. How far past ones body ones
actions progress is at least partly a matter of luck, for what
actions one has performed inmoving ones body is often amatter
of what events ones bodily movements cause, or fail to cause,
and this is subject to a whole variety of well-known vicissitudes.
Whether, to use Donald Davidsons famous example, my
intentionally moving my ﬁnger is the act of illuminating the
room depends on whether my bodily movement causes the
switch to ﬂip, and whether its ﬂipping causes electricity to ﬂow to
the light, and whether that ﬂow actually results in the lights
being illuminated, and whether the lights illumination spreads
to the room itself.10 Thus it seems that if a particular act counts
as a substantial step, so should any step that diﬀers from it only
in virtue of what happens to be caused by the agents bodily
movement. If shooting someone is a substantial step towards
killing him, then so should pulling the trigger be, for whether the
pulling of the trigger is a shooting depends on much that is out of
the agents control, such as the guns being in working order, and
the absence of any fortuitously placed birds to intercept the
bullet. But, by the same reasoning, if pulling a trigger is a sub-
stantial step towards killing someone, then so should be moving
10 Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons and Causes in Essays on Actions
and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 3–19.
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ones ﬁnger (in just the way one does when one pulls a trigger),
for whether the moving of ones ﬁnger is a pulling of a trigger,
rather than a mere moving of ones ﬁnger, turns on such chance
factors as the presence of the trigger; if the gun hadnt had one,
ones ﬁnger movement would not have been a pulling of a trig-
ger. Thus, theres no principled reason to deﬁne the shooting to
be a substantial step and not themoving of the ﬁnger, if ones aim
is for the diﬀerence between attempt and completion to be a
merely lucky diﬀerence.
Further, and worse, whether ones intent makes its way into
even simple physical action is always, in part, a matter of
luck—we need well-wired bodies and curare-free bloodstreams
to accomplish the trick. Thus it seems that the gap between
merely intending to act and taking substantial steps will involve
at least some luck. If theres no moral luck it would follow that
any deﬁnition of ‘‘substantial step’’ that sees a simple bodily
action as necessary to have taken a substantial step is drawing a
moral difference where there is only a lucky difference, for the
person who performs any physical action still differs only by luck
from someone who has done less, or, perhaps, has merely in-
tended. Why is the twitch of the ﬁnger a substantial step towards
shooting someone, and not the mere tensing of the muscle in the
man whose ﬁngers arent responding to the tensing of his mus-
cles? And if the tensing of the muscle is sufﬁcient, why isnt the
sending of the neural impulse to the muscle sufﬁcient in the man
whose muscles arent responding to neural impulses? And so on.
In short, the fact that the route from bodily movement to
completion is subject to luck places pressure on those who deny
moral luck to see substantial steps as no more than basic
physical actions. And the fact that the route from intention to
bodily movement is subject to luck places pressure on those
who deny moral luck to see a substantial step as something less,
even, than any bodily movement, including a basic physical
action. These are the results we reach by repeatedly subtracting
luck and repeatedly refusing to allow there to be either a moral
difference or a difference in punishment between the person
whom we started with and the person who results when luck is
subtracted. Thus, it seems that a legal regime that takes some
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acts performed from the belief that they are means to doing as
the agent intends to be necessary for an attempted crime, and
which holds ﬁrmly to a moral justiﬁcation of punishment, is
committed to some form of moral luck, even if it also gives the
same sentences to those who merely attempt crimes and to
those who complete them.
I say that this seems to be so. In fact, under the view to be
argued for in this paper, this is merely an appearance: one can
consistently accept the following three propositions:
(i) There is no moral luck.
(ii) An attempted crime consists of an intention and substantial steps.
(iii)An event is a substantial step only if it is an action performed by
the agent as a means to doing as he intends.
For simplicity, lets call the conjunction of (ii) and (iii) ‘‘the
requirement of substantial steps’’. The challenge is to justify the
requirement of substantial steps while consistently denying that
there is moral luck.
In fact, it can seem very easy to meet the challenge. A ﬁrst
approach sees the requirement of substantial steps as arising
from what is known as ‘‘the act requirement’’, the legal stric-
ture resting on the idea that criminal punishment is never
justiﬁably applied simply in virtue of the thoughts or disposi-
tions of its recipient; some kind of action is needed for criminal
responsibility. This requirement imposes a restriction on the
deﬁnitions of crimes: no crime can be deﬁned in such a way
that all of its elements can be present despite the defendant
having performed no voluntary action.11 The easiest way to
meet this demand, in crafting a deﬁnition of a crime, is to
include an act among the elements of the crime.12 The act
11 This is a bit weaker than the claim that every crime must have an act as
an element. It leaves open the possibility that a deﬁnition of an oﬀense meets
the act requirement if some result or circumstantial element requires that the
defendant performed a voluntary act. However, for our purposes this dis-
tinction is of little importance.
12 Another way would be to include a result or circumstance among the
elements that can only be present if the agent performs some voluntary act.
See the previous footnote.
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requirement is undoubtedly justiﬁed.13 Further, it seems that it
should be justiﬁable independently of any view about moral
luck; whether one accepts or denies moral luck, that is, one
would still have suﬃcient reason to accept the act requirement.
Thus, the requirement of substantial steps, on this view, is
purely formal: its required for the deﬁnition of attempt to meet
the act requirement, but it is not intended to sort the morally
deserving of punishment from the morally undeserving, nor is
it intended to lump defendants who diﬀer only with respect to
luck. Since the act requirement is not intended to do either of
these things, on this view, neither is the requirement of sub-
stantial steps. The seeming inconsistency among (i), (ii) and (iii)
arises, in part, from the assumption that the requirement of
substantial steps is to serve one or both of these functions.
The suggested view simply denies this assumption by identi-
fying a distinct purpose of the requirement of substantial steps,
namely, to meet the act requirement.
There is something right about this ﬁrst approach, but it is not
sufﬁcient to justify the requirement of substantial steps, and so is
insufﬁcient to relieve the tension among (i), (ii) and (iii). The
problem is that a requirementmuchweaker than the requirement
of substantial steps could serve to satisfy the demands of the act
requirement. A law of attempts, for instance, that took action
expressive of intent, but not taken by the defendant to be ameans
to the execution of his intention—such as, for instance, a verbal
report by the defendant of his intention—would also satisfy the
act requirements demand.14 Indicating why the inconsistency
13 For discussion see, for instance, Herbert Morris, Punishment for
Thoughts in Monist, v. 49, 1965, pp. 342–376; Gerald Dworkin and David
Blumenfeld, Punishment for Intentions in Mind, v. 75, 1966, pp. 396–404;
Michael Moore, Act and Crime, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, esp. chs. 2
& 3.
14 There is logical space to deny this claim. One who does so, however,
would need to provide a justiﬁcation for the act requirement, consistent with
the denial of moral luck, which had the implication that only acts taken as
means to doing as one intends could satisfy the act requirement. To provide
such a justiﬁcation is just as hard as it is to provide a justiﬁcation of the
requirement of substantial steps; in fact, the two tasks are the same. Hence
someone who chooses to occupy this bit of logical space doesnt evade the
problem that this paper is trying to solve.
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between (i), (ii) and (iii) ismerely apparent requiresmore than can
be provided by an appeal to the need not to criminalize mere
thoughts and dispositions.
A second approach tries to make (i), (ii) and (iii) consistent by
appealing to special purposes of legal punishment that are fur-
thered by sometimes punishing only one of two equally deserv-
ing defendants. Under such a view, although there is no moral
difference, but only a lucky difference, between the person who
has the intention and takes steps that fall short of being sub-
stantial, on the one hand, and the person who takes substantial
steps, on the other, there is some other difference, admittedly due
only to luck, that makes it appropriate to punish only the latter.
For instance, if our aim in punishing is to threaten just enough
unpleasantness, and no more, as is needed to lower the incidence
of the peculiar forms of damage that crimes cause, then wemight
deﬁne substantial steps, with Oliver Wendell Holmes,15 to be
those acts that impose a severe risk of performance, are in
‘‘dangerous proximity’’, of the completed crime. Thus, although
the person who intends to act and takes less-than-substantial
steps is just as morally culpable as the person who takes sub-
stantial steps, the latter, but not the former, is worthy of criminal
punishment. It makes sense to send ones few ﬁretrucks to the ﬁre
thats close to the city, neglecting the one far away, and to do so
isnt to imply that the ﬁre one chooses to ﬁght is any more of a
conﬂagration than the ﬁre burning harmlessly far away; its
simply more dangerous. Similarly, we should invest what
resources we have for punishment, according to this line, in
punishing those types of act that are more likely to cause the
harms associated with completed crimes, which isnt to say that
they are morally worse than those that fall farther short of
completion. This approach to justifying the requirement of
substantial steps, while accepting that there is no moral luck, is
exactly as defensible or indefensible as the view of the justiﬁca-
tion of criminal punishment that it presupposes, a view that has
15 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, Boston: Little Brown,
1881, pp. 68–69.
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been extensively explored.16 This paper says nothing to suggest
that this approach is ﬂawed, although I believe it to be.17 For our
purposes here it is enough, perhaps, to lay bare one of the
assumptions of the ensuing discussion: if the requirement of
substantial steps can be justiﬁed in a way that does not require us
to cleave criminal punishment away from moral desert, such a
justiﬁcation is to be preferred to any alternative. Such a justiﬁ-
cation is provided here, and so there is no need to huddle
behind the need for social order as justiﬁcation for giving
unequal treatment to equally deserving defendants, as this sec-
ond approach does.
A third approach appeals to the nature of trying to act and
insists that trying to act involves two components: a mental
state such as an intention, and some further act performed by
the agent in furtherance of the intention. The idea is that in
proscribing trying to act criminally, we are, necessarily and
because of the very nature of trying to act, proscribing more
than just a mental state; the mental state must be manifested in
the form of mental or bodily action. While there may be
intention, there will have been no eﬀort, on this view, unless
and until there has been some step. Hence, the requirement of
substantial steps is justiﬁed for roughly the same reasons that
our law is justiﬁed in holding that there has been no murder if
there has been no death; the very nature of murder requires a
death and the very nature of attempt requires action.
As well see, the approach to justifying the requirement of
substantial steps to be presented here bears afﬁnities to this
approach and we will return to compare them later. However, it
is important to see that as so far formulated the approach fails
to meet the stricture on a justiﬁcation imposed by those who
think there is no moral luck. After all, just as the question of
whether or not a person commits a murder is often in part a
16 For an entrance into the vast literature on this topic, see Joel Feinberg,
The Classic Debate in Philosophy of Law, Feinberg and Coleman, eds.,
Belmont: Wadsworth-Thomson, pp. 799–804.
17 I say a word or two about such an approach as applied in another
context in The Government Beguiled Me: The Entrapment Defense and the
Problem of Private Entrapment in The Journal of Ethics and Social Phi-
losophy, v. 1, n. 1, 2005. See especially pp. 18–19.
TRYING, ACTING AND ATTEMPTED CRIMES 121
matter of luck—if the paramedics had arrived just moments
earlier, there would have been no death and so no murder—-
under the view that takes a component of trying to act to be a
substantial step, trying to act will, itself, be partly a matter of
luck. Compare two agents who have the relevant mental state
but only one of whom is lucky enough to have that mental state
cause the action component of trying to act; nothing but luck
distinguishes them, but if trying to act is legally proscribed,
then this lucky difference makes a moral difference. Perhaps
it will turn out that trying to act includes action, as proposed.
But even if it is true it cannot be this fact that justiﬁes
the requirement of substantial steps without that justiﬁcation
relying on the existence of moral luck as a premise. The mere
fact that trying to act includes action doesnt justify punishing
those who try and not those with the same intentions who,
because of luck, fail to try, unless there is moral luck.
A fourth approach, which is the centerpiece of the discussion
here, starts where the second approach does, by asserting that
the requirement of substantial steps serves a distinct legal
interest from the interest in punishing the culpable. However,
the third approach departs from the second by suggesting that
the requirement of substantial steps serves the interest of pun-
ishing the culpable whose culpability is in the right way evident to
us. Further, there might be reasons for thinking that only when
a defendant has taken substantial steps do we have the right
kind of evidence of his culpability. So, although we recognize
that there are equally culpable agents who diﬀer only in luck
from those whom we convict of attempted crimes, the lucky
diﬀerence does not speak to a diﬀerence in culpability, but,
instead, to a diﬀerence in our evidence for culpability. So, just as
we dont see an inconsistency in a legal regime that convicts
only the thief whose theft is proven by the admissible evidence,
and not the thief who, through a lucky break could not be
proven to be one, perhaps because crucial pieces of evidence
were inadmissible, there is no inconsistency in (i), (ii) and (iii).
As attractive as this easy solution to the problem is, the next
section of this paper will argue that it is incomplete as it stands
and completing the solution is no easy task. Roughly, the
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problem is that there doesnt appear to be anything particularly
special about substantial steps when only their evidential im-
port is considered; other forms of evidence would do just as
well. But if so, then why not simply require that the defendant
have the features that are evidenced by substantial steps and
that he or she be proven to have them beyond a reasonable
doubt? Why make substantial steps a distinct element of the
crime of attempt?
The third section of the paper attempts to answer these
questions. The aim of that section is to provide a criterion that
an agent must meet if he is to be rightly said to be trying to do
something. From this it emerges that it is no simple thing to have
evidence that a person is really trying to do something he failed
to do. To have such evidence we need to have evidence that he is
guaranteed with necessity to complete the act under certain
speciﬁed circumstances. It emerges that actions taken as a means
to reaching an intended end could provide such evidence, and it
seems extremely unlikely that anything else could provide such
evidence. Thus, substantial steps are important for evidential
reasons, although not for the evidential reasons adduced in
Section 2. Substantial steps, it emerges, are an indispensable
form of evidence; they are indispensable evidence that the agent
is really trying to act criminally; it is almost certain that nothing
else would do. This we learn from reﬂecting on the very idea of
trying. Section 4 indicates what the implications might be of the
result of Section 3 to the question of how to distinguish between
substantial and insubstantial steps.
III. THE OBSTACLE TO AN EVIDENTIALIST SOLUTION
Consider an agent who has committed a crime, has no justiﬁ-
cation or excuse, and is morally deserving of punishment for
doing so. Many of the properties of the agent are irrelevant to
the justiﬁcation of the claim that he deserves punishment for
the crime. Ordinarily included in the class of irrelevant prop-
erties, for instance, are his hair color, his birthday, his parents
criminal history, and so on. Doubtless we can imagine
extraordinary cases in which all of these properties are relevant
for some reason or other; we can imagine cases, that is, in which
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appeal to them is part of what justiﬁes the claim that the agent
is deserving of punishment for his crime. But, still, there are
always, in every case, many properties of the agent that play no
part in that justiﬁcation. Lets call that set of features of an
agent, his actions or his circumstances that do play a part in the
justiﬁcation of the claim that he deserves punishment for a
crime, the agents ‘‘culpability-constituting features’’. We can
imagine a variety of theories about what is and is not included
in the class of culpability-constituting features of agents gen-
erally, or of a particular agent. Is the agents degree of remorse
of relevance? Is the fact that the agent suﬀered a childhood of
deprivation and abuse of relevance? Is the agents character of
relevance? These and related questions are diﬃcult, but the
concept of culpability-constituting features as such is neutral
with respect to various answers to them.
On an extreme view, the culpability-constituting feature of
someone who commits a crime without justiﬁcation or excuse18
is just his mental state, such as his intention to act in the ways
necessary for the completed crime, or his reckless indiﬀerence to
the harms that his conduct would be likely to cause. According
to such a position, agents with the same intention, who act dif-
ferently, might diﬀer in many ways, but they do not diﬀer in the
degree to which they deserve punishment; if the law mandates
that one is punished and not the other, or that they are to be
punished diﬀerently, on this view, it is not because of a diﬀerence
in the degree to which they are morally deserving of punishment,
but because of some other diﬀerence between them. At the
18 Throughout, I am assuming that the defendant accused of attempt has
neither a justiﬁcation nor an excuse for his conduct. Therefore, limiting
ourselves to consideration of the culpability-constituting features of those
who complete crimes and lack justiﬁcation or excuse is harmless. There are,
however, diﬃcult questions that I am setting aside about how to understand
the relationship between justiﬁcation and excuse and those features that
justify the claim that the defendant is morally deserving of punishment. Do
excuses, for instance, always indicate that the agent lacks one of those
features? Do justiﬁcations show that the person is not to be punished despite
possessing features that make him morally deserving of punishment, or
would under other circumstances?
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opposite extreme is a view that takes the culpability-constituting
features of an agent to include the acts and results, and perhaps
even the circumstances necessary for the crime he completed. On
this view, there is a diﬀerence in the culpability-constituting
features of the defendant who completes the crime and the
defendant who attempts it and fails. Lets assume that one of the
class of views falling short of this last extreme is correct; lets
assume, that is, that something less than completion of the crime
is needed to realize the relevant culpability-constituting features.
This is not to say that we need go all the way to the other extreme
and assert that the defendants mental state determines, all by
itself, the degree to which he is deserving of punishment; we
could go this far, but we neednt. All that we are assuming for
now is that if we do take the culpability-constituting features of
agents to include more than mental state, we dont thereby take
them to include all that is involved in completing the crime, and
we might very well take mental state to be suﬃcient.
The view to be considered in this section can be stated like
so: Substantial steps are required for an attempted crime
because they serve as evidence of the same (or worse19) culpa-
bility-constituting features as found in those who complete the
crime without justiﬁcation or excuse. The idea is simple enough:
If precisely that which justiﬁes taking the person who completes
the crime to be morally deserving of punishment is present also
in the person who attempts the crime, then the person who
makes the attempt is just as deserving of punishment as the
person who completes the crime. But it is also important that
we have adequate evidence of this similarity between the
defendant being tried for attempt and those who complete the
19 This parenthetical appears here to capture cases in which the completed
crime does not require intent (such as purposive homicide which requires
only that the defendant foresaw with certainty that a death would result
from the act he intended) but the attempted crime does. In such cases, the
acts the defendant undertook as means provide evidence of his intent, not
his recklessness, and so they provide evidence of a diﬀerent set of features
from the culpability-constituting features of the person who completes the
crime. However, since intent is thought is to make one that much more
deserving of punishment than recklessness, the requirement of substantial
steps is still justiﬁed because of the evidence that substantial steps are
thought to provide.
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crime. Under the view, to require substantial steps is to con-
strain the evidentiary route through which the culpability-
constituting features are shown to be present: the prosecution
must provide the sort of evidence of those features that is
provided by showing that the defendant adopted means to
doing as directed by his criminal intention.
The Model Penal Code adopts this approach in its test for
determining if a defendants acts do, indeed, constitute sub-
stantial steps. According to the MPC,
Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step…unless it is
strongly corroborative of the actors criminal purpose. (Model Penal Code
§5.01(2))20
There are two elements to the MPCs approach that distin-
guish it from other evidentialist views of the sort under consid-
eration in this section. First, the MPCs approach assumes that
the defendants mental state is all that is included among the
culpability-constituting features of the person who completes
the crime; that is why the act need only be evidence of the mental
state of the person who attempts the crime (namely his inten-
tion), and nothing other than that, for it to count as a substantial
step. Second, the MPCs approach assumes that an act neednt
be suﬃcient evidence to establish, all by itself and beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant had the relevant mental
state. We can imagine views that vary from theMPCs in both of
these dimensions, either taking something other than mere
mental state to be required for desert of punishment for the
completed crime (such as a trait of character or a disposition), or
by either strengthening, or even weakening, the evidential
relation between the act and the relevant culpability-constituting
features, if the act is to count as a substantial step. Under
20 The MPCs formulation does not make explicit that the conduct in
question must be believed by the defendant to be a means to doing as he
intends. For all the text says, a verbal report that was ‘‘strongly corrobo-
rative’’ of the defendants intention would satisfy the act requirement.
However, despite what the text says, it is clear that the MPC requires that
the conduct in question be believed by the defendant to be a means to doing
as he intends.
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discussion in this section is the full family of views of which the
MPCs is just one member.
Its important to emphasize the distinctive feature of the
MPCs approach which is shared by all other approaches in the
family under consideration here and which can seem somewhat
puzzling. All of these views make two demands: ﬁrst, that the
prosecution show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
had the intention required for the crime of attempt, and, second,
that the acts which the defendant took constitute evidence of his
intention (and possibly more than just his intention). To meet
the ﬁrst demand, the prosecution can appeal to the defendants
steps but they can appeal to much more than just those; they can
appeal, for instance, to his verbal reports of his intentions, to
other acts that are expressive of intent but are not performed as
means to doing as he intends, and even to things other than his
actions that might serve to evidence his intent, such as the
judgments of psychiatrists and other experts. But to meet the
second demand, the prosecution must argue, even if it has al-
ready met the ﬁrst demand, that the acts which the defendant
took as means to doing as he intended constitute, themselves,
non-trivial evidence of his intent (and of whatever else is
included among the relevant set of culpability-constituting fea-
tures). So, the prosecution has to provide adequate evidence of
intent and a large part of the prosecutions case for the claim that
the defendant had the requisite intent must derive from the acts
the defendant performed in furtherance of his intention.
By analogy, but also by contrast, consider an approach for
justifying the exclusion of coerced confessions from evidence.
Although coerced confessions are, generally, of less probative
value than uncoerced confessions—they are more likely to be
made by the innocent, that is, than uncoerced confessions—there
are, still, coerced confessions that constitute evidence of guilt;
some people confess under coercion because they are guilty, even
if they also do so in order to stop the beating. So, in excluding
coerced confessions, we exclude from the jurys consideration
some facts that could help them to reach a more accurate ver-
dict. This practice is justiﬁed by appeal, ﬁrst, to the obvious
and pressing interests that are protected through this blanket
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exclusion, such as the interest that guilty and innocent alike have
in a police force that doesnt do this sort of thing, and the interest
that we all have in keeping from the jury evidence the epistemic
import of which they are likely to exaggerate; and, second,
through a claim to the eﬀect that these protected interests out-
weigh the resulting loss in protection from crime. What we have
here is a common form of justiﬁcatory explanation of legal
doctrines specifying the exclusion of some type of evidence: in
justifying the doctrine in question, we note both the probative
value of the excluded evidence and the losses of other sorts
associated with allowing it to reach the jury; we then claim that
the losses resulting from exclusion are outweighed by the gains.
The particular evils that we exclude coerced confessions to
avoid are either not at risk or not avoidable through imposing the
requirement of substantial steps. It is true that under the evi-
dentialist justiﬁcation of the requirement of substantial steps,
that requirement, like the exclusion of coerced confessions,
constrains the evidentiary route through which the prosecution
can meet its burden. But the requirement differs from the
exclusion of coerced confessions in (at least) one important
respect: where the exclusion of coerced confessions bars the
prosecution from producing a certain sort of evidence, the
requirement of substantial steps, under the class of views onoﬀer,
instead requires the prosecution to produce a certain sort of
evidence. Its not enough merely to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had the culpability-constituting fea-
tures of those who complete the crime; this needs to be shown in a
particular way, through appeal to the acts that he performed as
means todoing as he intended.What this implies is that there is an
important diﬀerence between the justiﬁcation for the exclusion of
coerced confessions and the justiﬁcation along evidentialist
lines for the requirement of substantial steps. A justiﬁcation of
the requirement of substantial steps cannot appeal to the dangers
of allowing any particular sort of evidence, for the requirement
does not exclude any kind of evidence. It must rather appeal to
either the dangers of allowing conviction when there are only
other forms of evidence of the relevant culpability-constituting
features, or, correlatively, the goods achieved through requiring
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the kind of evidence that is supplied by substantial steps. What
this implies is that in requiring substantial steps, in contrast to
excluding coerced confessions, we do not incentivize the police
not to act badly, for there is no kind of evidence, no matter how
brutally acquired, that the requirement itself tells our government
it is not allowed to use. Similarly, the requirement of substantial
steps does not remove from the jurys consideration any evidence
that the jury is likely to weigh more heavily than it warrants; the
jury will still be asked to consider, for instance, the defendants
verbal reports of his intentions. Thus, it seems, the view on oﬀer
needs to identify some other interests, distinct from the interests
served by excluding coerced confessions, which is served by
constraining the way the prosecutionmustmeet its burden in the
way the requirement of substantial steps does. What could those
interests be?
By excluding coerced confessions we lower the incidence of a
form of involuntary speech, namely confessions prompted by
coercion. Perhaps by imposing the requirement of substantial
steps we make room for certain forms of valuable voluntary
speech that would otherwise be quelled, namely speech expres-
sive of intent.21 The point can be illustrated with an example.
Consider the case of State v. Duke (700 So. 2d 580 (Fla. App.
1998)). The defendant had a series of conversations in an internet
chat room with someone going by the name of ‘‘Niki’’ and
claiming to be a 12-year old girl. ‘‘Niki’’ and Duke discussed
having sex and then arranged to meet for that purpose in a
parking lot on a particular night. They agreed that Duke would
signal by ﬂashing his lights and then take ‘‘Niki’’ back to his
home. Duke went to the parking lot at the appointed time and
ﬂashed his lights, at which point he was arrested by the detective
who had posed as ‘‘Niki’’. He was charged with attempted sexual
battery.
Although the intention to commit sexual battery of the
person who commits that crime without justiﬁcation or excuse
may not be the only culpability-constituting feature of that
person, it is certainly among them. Thus, two crucial questions
to ask in determining if Duke has taken substantial steps, under
21 Thanks to Seana Shiﬀrin for pressing this point in conversation.
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the evidentialist justiﬁcation of the requirement under discus-
sion here, are these: What is the nature of our evidence of
Dukes intention? And do the actions that Duke took as means
to further his intention serve as particularly strong evidence of
his intent—in the language of the Model Penal Code, do those
actions ‘‘strongly corroborate’’ his having the relevant inten-
tion? The relevant evidence consists in two diﬀerent sorts of
conduct on Dukes part: conduct that is merely expressive of
various mental states such as desires and intentions but is not
performed in order to further his intentions, and conduct that
Duke takes to actually further his intention to commit sexual
battery. By deﬁnition, none of the conduct in the ﬁrst category
can constitute, even partially, substantial steps on Dukes part;
those actions arent performed by him as means to further his
intention, and so arent substantial steps. So, if Duke took
substantial steps, he did so only in virtue of having performed
the acts in the second category.
What conduct of Dukes belongs in the second category, the
category of acts performed as means to doing as he intends? It
seems clear that in this category belong Dukes proposal to meet,
his suggestions about how to go about it, his driving to the
parking lot at the agreed time, and his ﬂashing his lights. In
performing these actions, he is acting on his intention to commit
a crime; hes adopting means to doing as he intends. What
conduct belongs in the ﬁrst category, the category of acts
expressive of intent, but not performed in order to further the
intention? Consider, for instance, the various things that Duke
says in the chat room prior to proposing a meeting. In saying
these things, is Duke taking means to doing as he intends—is he
‘‘warming up’’ his intended prey, say—or is he, rather, simply
acting in a way which is explained by his intention, but is not
performed by him in order to further it? By analogy, imagine
that I intend to leave my house and, onmy way out, I turn on the
porch light. My turning on the porch light is expressive of my
intention to leave, but it is not performed in order to further that
intention as, say, my turning the front door knob is; I get no
closer, and dont believe myself to get any closer, to leaving my
house by turning on the porch light. Still, the fact that I did this is
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expressive of my intention to leave. Are the things Duke says in
the chat room prior to proposing the meeting more like the
turning on of the porch light, or more like the turning of the door
knob? The fact is that we dont know enough about Duke to
know the answer to this question.What this suggests is that there
is reasonable doubt as to whether or not the conduct in question
is performed byDuke as ameans to doing as he intends, and so if
that were all he had done there would have been reasonable
doubt that he had taken substantial steps. Lets assume, then,
that the conduct in question is merely expressive of intention,
and not performed in order to further his intention. It makes
sense to construe Dukes conduct in this way, within the stric-
tures of reasonable doubt.
Now, the suggestion which launched discussion of this
example was this: perhaps the requirement of substantial steps
serves to protect certain forms of speech, speech that would be
disincentivized were there no such requirement. In the context of
our example, there appear to be two forms of speech that would
be disincentivized were there no requirement of substantial steps:
(1) speech expressive of the intention to commit sexual battery
made by those who have that intention, but not made in fur-
therance of that intention, and (2) speech that would constitute
evidence of intent to commit sexual battery made by those who
dont actually have that intention but who are speaking as a way
of acting out a fantasy or pretending to have the relevant
intention. After all, people offering both kinds of speech in chat
rooms would ﬁnd themselves at risk of prosecution for at-
tempted sexual battery were there no requirement of substantial
steps, for there would be evidence, in both cases, of one of the
culpability-constituting features of those who commit the crime,
namely the intention to do so.
There are a wide variety of reasons why we might not want
our legal system to have a chilling effect on these kinds of
speech. But its important to see that many of these reasons
cannot coherently be appealed to by the advocate of the evi-
dentialist justiﬁcation for the requirement of substantial steps
under discussion. For instance, we might hold the view that
speech of the sort being considered serves as a harmless ‘‘release
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valve’’ for those with the intention to commit crimes; the sug-
gestion is that the requirement of substantial steps then lowers
the incidence of completed crimes by providing those who
might commit them with another way to release their criminal
impulses. The problem with this suggestion is that laws against
attempted crimes generally serve to lower the incidence of
completed crimes and so the harder it is for people to be found
guilty of attempt, the less of an impact such laws will have. It is
then an empirical question whether we will have more or less
completed crimes by incentivizing or disincentivizing the sort of
speech described. But it doesnt seem that the justiﬁcation of the
requirement of substantial steps should need to await the out-
come of the relevant empirical studies, studies that would need
to be done to answer that question.
Another reason we might offer in favor of laws that dont
disincentivize language expressive or naturally taken to be
expressive of criminal intentions is this: to speak in such a way as
to express intention simply doesnt provide any evidence that the
speaker will act on such an intention, but since it is action in
furtherance of criminal intention that we want to discourage,
nothing is gained by discouraging the relevant kinds of speech.
This reason, however, cannot be accepted by someone who holds
the evidentialist justiﬁcation of the requirement of substantial
steps. After all, someone who offers this reason, and who also
accepts that criminal punishment is justiﬁed only when deserved,
holds that the person who has a criminal intention but does not
take a means to doing as he intends is less deserving of punish-
ment than someone who does adopt means. Thus, for such a
person, taking ameans is not of importance because it is evidence
of some set of culpability constituting feature or features of the
person who commits the crime; it is, rather, of importance be-
cause it is part of what makes such a person deserving of pun-
ishment.
Of course, one can take (certain forms of) speech, and the
freedom to engage in (those forms of) it, to be of intrinsic value,
and see there as always being some kind of loss from any sort of
social or legal policy that results in less of it. Someone who
takes this approach can justify the requirement of substantial
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steps on the evidentialist line under discussion, but only if he is
also willing to accept that the loss in probatively valuable evi-
dence brought about by the requirement, and all that is entailed
by that loss, is outweighed by the value of the speech and the
freedom to speak that is thereby not disincentivized. It would
be extraordinary to discover that all those who take the
requirement of substantial steps to be justiﬁed are committed to
such a strong position about the value of speech and the free-
dom to engage in it.
However, imagine that it were agreed that the balance sheet of
the requirement of substantial steps is positive. Say it were
agreed, that is, that the loss in probatively valuable evidence
brought on by the requirement is outweighed by the gain in fewer
disincentives to speech. Would this serve to justify the require-
ment of substantial steps? It would not serve to those who accept
the following (roughly formulated) restriction on justiﬁcations
of criminal law doctrines: A justiﬁcation of a criminal law doc-
trine is acceptable only if it could lead a defendant who is pun-
ished as a result of the doctrine, while other equally deserving
defendants are not, to recognize the justice of his treatment.
Doubtless this restriction would need to be formulated with
greater care if it is to be fully defensible. But the rough idea has
great appeal. Imagine a defendant who is arrested after saying
precisely the things that Duke said prior to proposing a meeting
and imagine that it is shown that that defendant had the inten-
tion to commit sexual battery; this man is acquitted of attempt
on the grounds that his conduct did not constitute substantial
steps. Now imagine that Duke is convicted and he asks why he,
who had the same intention as the other man and who caused no
more harm than the other man, is to be punished while the other
man goes free. Can we expect Duke to recognize the justice of
this when it is explained to him the effect that the alternative
would have on speech? This seems to be the wrong kind of reason
to give to Duke in such a circumstance. It is not a reason linked
to the deeply moral functions of the practice of criminal pun-
ishment.
The discussion so far has focused on goods and evils gained
and avoided through the requirement of substantial steps that
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are, themselves, independent of the probative value of the evi-
dence provided by action performed as a means of doing as one
intends. The analogy with the exclusion of coerced confessions
pushed us in that direction since that exclusion is to be justiﬁed
by appeal to such goods and evils. But perhaps there is some
positive probative evidential value to action taken in further-
ance of intention. Perhaps such behavior serves as evidence of
some set of culpability-constituting features that simply are not
evidenced any other way. If this were so, that would serve the
evidentialist justiﬁcation of the requirement of substantial steps
under discussion. What are the prospects of such an approach?
In answering this question, assume for a moment not just that
an intention to commit sexual battery is among the culpability-
constituting features of the person who completes that crime, but
that it is the only such feature. Under this assumption, it is hard
to see what special probative signiﬁcance there could be to action
performed byDuke in furtherance of his intention. To be sure, in
Dukes case, conduct expressive of intent, but not performed in
order to further his intention, was insuﬃcient to establish intent.
Notice, however, that the acts he performed in order to further
his intention were also insuﬃcient: without knowing about his
chat room conversations we can imagine a variety of reasonable
explanations for the act, say, of driving to the parking lot and
ﬂashing his lights that dont involve ascribing him with any
criminal intention, much less the intention to commit acts that
would constitute sexual battery. Imagine replacing each act that
he performed in furtherance of his intention with an act merely
expressive of intention, but with the same probative signiﬁcance.
If, say, his driving to the parking lot raises the probability by x
that he has the intention, then imagine that the record shows,
instead, some act expressive of intention, but not performed in
furtherance of it, but which raises that probability by precisely x.
Perhaps we imagine that hes had conversations with a friend in
which hes mentioned his intention to have sex with a child;
‘‘No,’’ he said, in response to questioning, ‘‘I really do intend to
do it. Im not just talking here.’’ Or perhaps we imagine that hes
purchased pornography depicting the very acts that he has de-
scribed himself as having an intention to commit.
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So long as the only culpability-constituting feature is the
intention, the evidentialist approach fails to identify any special
evidential signiﬁcance to action taken in furtherance of intention,
and so fails to explain why substantial steps are essential for the
crime; they provide good evidence of intent, granted, but evi-
dence of equal quality could be provided through an alternative
route. But what if the culpability-constituting features of the
completed crime include more than just intent? In that case, do
actions performed asmeans to doing as one intends provide some
special kind of evidence?Here we encounter two types of account
of the culpability-constituting features. According to the ﬁrst, the
acts that are taken to be substantial steps are, themselves, among
the culpability-constituting features of the completed crime. In
short, on such a view, the person who completes the crime is
deserving of punishment in part because of the steps that he took
in acting on his intention, steps that the person who merely
attempts the crime also took. According to the second, there is
something more than intention that is required for desert of
punishment, but it is something distinct from those acts that are
the defendants substantial steps. For instance, wemight say that
what makes the person who completes the crime deserving
of punishment is not just that he intends to do something crim-
inal, but also that he is resolved, or determined, to act on his
intention. So, something more than intention is among the rele-
vant culpability-constituting features: determination, or resolve
(whatever that is) is also among them.
The ﬁrst of these two approaches amounts to giving up on the
evidentialist approach for reasons similar to those encountered
by one effort to support the requirement of substantial steps
through appeal to considerations of free speech. If substantial
steps are, themselves, part of what makes a criminal deserving of
punishment, then they are hardly evidence of something else of
signiﬁcance; they are the signiﬁcant things, on such a view. To
take the evidentialist line here would be like saying that the
victims being dead is an essential element of murder because its
good evidence that the victim is dead. More importantly for our
purposes, such a view involves a commitment to moral luck in
a way encountered earlier. After all, whether the agent has
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performed the acts that are taken to be among the culpability-
constituting features will be, in part, amatter of luck and so there
will be agents who diﬀer in the degree to which they are morally
deserving of punishment despite the fact that the diﬀerence
between them is only due to luck. From the point of view of one
whowishes to justify the requirement of substantial stepswithout
appeal to moral luck, this is to give up the game.
The second of these two approaches, exempliﬁed by the view
that it is not just intent, but intent-plus-resolve that is required for
desert of punishment, has the same problem as that illustrated by
our discussion of the view that there is no more to the relevant
culpability-constituting features than intent. Without saying
more about the nature of the additional culpability-constituting
features, there is no reason to think that something other than
substantial steps could not serve just as well as evidence of those
features. Obvious candidates for the culpability-constituting
feature, such as resolute intent, do not provide the viewwithwhat
it needs. True, we might not take ﬁrst-person reports of the
defendants resolute intention to be very good evidence of it. We
dont necessarily trust the person who says, conﬁdently, ‘‘Im
resolved to jump from the plane when the hatch opens.’’ ‘‘Talk is
cheap,’’ we say, implying that the real test of such resolution is
action; nomere report of ones own degree of resolve will serve as
evidence of resolute intention. However, there are other forms of
evidence of resolute intention besides either ﬁrst-person reports
or action performed in furtherance of it. It is common enough
for applicants to various jobs that require resolve to be given
psychological tests in order to determine if, for instance, they
would really, when it came to it, leap in front of the bullet shot at
the President. It seems quite likely that peoplewho pass such tests
really are more likely, maybe evenmuchmore likely, to have not
just the intention to do the thing the job might require, but the
resolute intention. To pass such a test, however, is not to take
steps towards furthering the intention and so cant be a sub-
stantial step. Still, the results of such tests would serve as useful
evidence of resolute intent. Further, the fact that a person has
been habituated in certain ways can serve as strong evidence of
the resoluteness of his intention. Someone who has undergone a
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certain kind ofmilitary training ismore likely to be resolute in his
intention to kill the enemy than someone who has not. Thus it
seems that evidence of such training, or, more generally, such
habituation, can serve as quite good evidence of resolute intent,
and not just intent. Relatedly, we often think that a persons
emotional reactions in a variety of contexts speak to the reso-
luteness of certain intentions on which he has not acted. The fury
felt by a person on reading about new legislation permittingmore
abortions, might, itself, serve as evidence—not decisive evidence,
but evidence still—of the resoluteness of his intention to bomb an
abortion clinic, an intention that he may have taken no steps
towards executing.
Even if we shift away from resolute intention directly, the
problem persists. For instance, imagine a view according to
which one of the culpability-constituting features of the person
who completes the crime is his failure to voluntarily abandon
the plan at some late stage.22 The claim would then be that for
the person who intended to commit the crime but who failed to
complete it to be guilty of attempt, it must be true that he
would not have abandoned the plan at the same late stage had
he reached it.23 The evidentialist justiﬁcation of the requirement
of substantial steps would then require asserting that action
taken by the agent as a means to doing as he intends is an
essential form of evidence of the fact that the agent would not
abandon his plan.
The problem with this is that if the adoption of means is to
count as evidence that the defendant would not reconsider, then
it must be true that people are more likely to abandon their
plans if they dont adopt means than if they do. It is true that to
adopt means is to sink costs into an enterprise that one hopes to
22 Such a view would ﬁt nicely with the defense of voluntary abandon-
ment under which a defendant can show himself to be not guilty by showing
that he actually already abandoned his plan to act criminally prior to arrest.
23 An approach that required that, in fact the defendant reached this late
stage without abandoning, and not just that he would not have abandoned
had he reached that stage, would be allowing moral luck: after all, whether
or not one reaches that late stage is often a matter of luck of just the sort
that those who advocate the same sentences for attempts as completed
crimes deny to be of moral signiﬁcance.
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recoup by succeeding in the enterprise. To abandon a plan after
sinking costs, then, is to assure a loss. Perhaps people are more
likely to follow through, then, if theyve already adopted means
because they want to avoid wasting their efforts. However, it
seems unlikely that reasoning of this sort will extend smoothly
to the kinds of cases that concern the criminal law. Consider
just one example that would seem, at ﬁrst glance, to be ame-
nable to this form of analysis. In a British case, Regina v.
Gullefer (1 WLR 1063 (1990)), the defendant had bet on a dog
race. In the middle of the race, seeing that his dog would lose,
he ran onto the track in the hope that the race would be voided
and he could reclaim his money from his bookmaker. He was
charged with attempted theft of the bookmakers money.24
There were, obviously, losses associated with his running onto
the track: public embarrassment and permanent expulsion from
the dog track, for instance. Now compare Gullefer to someone
who, like Gullefer, has the intention to steal from the book-
maker, but who has yet to adopt any means. Is there any reason
to think this person less likely to abandon his plan than
Gullefer is? It doesnt seem that the question turns on the
investment in stealing that Gullefer, in contrast to this person,
has already made, and so it doesnt seem likely that the adop-
tion of means really serves as evidence of the truth of the rel-
evant counterfactual. It just seems silly to imagine that Gullefer
would reason like so: ‘‘I dont want to waste the eﬀort of having
run onto the tracks, so Ill ask the bookmaker for my money
back.’’ He might or might not ask the bookmaker for the
money back, but the issue doesnt seem to have anything to do
with his having run onto the tracks, but depends, instead, on
other aspects of his temperament that he might or might not
share with the person who intends to steal from the bookmaker,
but who has yet to act on that intention. In fact, Gullefers
conduct is suﬃciently bird-brained that we might think him less
likely, rather than more likely, to follow-through with the plan
than the person who intends to steal but has yet to take any
steps.
24 The case is discussed in R. A. Duﬀ, Criminal Attempts, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996, pp. 58–59.
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So, we still dont have an adequate explanation for the
requirement of substantial steps. Under various proposals as to
what is included among the culpability-constituting features of
the completed crime, the requirement of substantial steps con-
demns a defendant who took substantial steps and not one who
did not, even if we have equally good evidence in each case that
the defendant possesses the proposed culpability-constituting
features of the person who completes the crime. This cannot be
justiﬁed under a view that takes substantial steps to be of sig-
niﬁcance only because of their evidential value.
The best way to think of the discussion thus far is like so:Recall
that theaim is toﬁndawayof consistently saying that (i) there is no
moral luck, that (ii) substantial steps are required for criminal
attempt, and that (iii) only acts performed in order to further the
defendants intention can be considered substantial steps. A suc-
cessful evidentialist approach tomaking (i), (ii) and (iii) consistent
must take oneof twoapproaches.Aﬁrst approach,which involves
a close analogy to the justiﬁcation of the exclusion of coerced
confessions, argues that although there is nothing of distinctive
probative value gained through the requirement of substantial
steps, there are other things that would either be lost without the
requirement or gained with it—there would be, for instance, a
limitation placed on free speech were there no requirement of
substantial steps thatwouldbeabsent under a system that imposed
the requirement. As weve seen, plausible efforts to take this ap-
proach encounter serious difﬁculties. A second approach argues,
instead, that the requirement of substantial steps is justiﬁed pre-
cisely because of the great probative value of actions taken as
means to doing as one intends; such an approach involves claim-
ing, that is, that action taken as a means to doing as one intends is
of such high probative value that the prosecution ought to be
required to produce it. This second approach requires two things:
First, the culpability-constituting features evidenced by action
taken as a means to doing as one intends must be distinct from
those actions themselves. Otherwise, acts taken as means are
thought of as important for someother reasonbesides the evidence
they provide of the culpability-constituting features and, more
importantly, such a view would involve a commitment to moral
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luck. Second, a successful evidentialist approach of this variety
must identify at least one culpability-constituting feature which
canbe evidenced onlyby actionsperformed to further an intention.
Otherwise, the requirement of substantial steps places a gratuitous
constraint, a constraint notworth the costs, on the evidential route
through which it is established that the defendant possesses the
relevant culpability-constituting features.Aswewill see in the next
section, these two constraints can indeed be met. It will be argued
that ourordinarynotionof trying to act requires that anagentwho
is trying engages in anact thatmaybedistinct fromtheadoptionof
means but which cannot be evidenced by anything other than acts
performed as means to doing as one intends.
IV. THE SOLUTION: ACTION AS EVIDENCE OF TRYING
The evidentialist strategy examined in the last section involved
an assumption. It involved the assumption that the requirement
of substantial steps must serve as evidence for something shared
between the defendant who completes the crime and the
defendant who makes a failed attempt. The tag ‘‘culpability-
constituting features’’ was used to refer to the thing that must be
shared, that which provides the justiﬁcation for taking the
person who completes the crime without justiﬁcation or excuse
to be deserving of punishment. The strategy was to suggest that
conduct undertaken as a means to acting criminally was evi-
dence of just those culpability-constituting features. However,
its possible to justify the requirement of substantial steps on
evidentialist lines without assuming that the defendants actions
must be evidence of something shared with the agent who
completes the crime. Perhaps, instead, actions taken as means to
doing as the defendant intends are evidence of the very thing
that we take ourselves to be criminalizing when we have laws
against attempted crimes; maybe, that is, such actions are
evidence that the defendant was trying to fulﬁll his criminal
intention. This section argues that this is so. Further, and
importantly, it argues that such actions are an indispensable
form of evidence. Evidence must meet stringent requirements if
it is to serve as evidence that an agent is trying to do something;
actions taken as means to doing as one intends meet these
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requirements and it seems close to impossible for any other
evidence to do so.
In order to understand the requirements that a fact must
meet if it is to serve as evidence that a defendant is trying to act,
start with the following claim about the relationship between
our ordinary concepts of ability, opportunity and trying:
(*) If ((S has the ability to A) & (S has the opportunity to A) & (S tries to
A)), then S As.
A variety of ordinary inferences that we make are explained
by appeal to our tacit adherence to (*). If were told that S tried
to A but failed, we infer either that S lacked what it takes to A
(that is, that S lacked the ability to A) or that Ss environment
threw up obstacles to Ss A-ing (that is, that S lacked the
opportunity to A). If were told that S has the ability to A and is
trying to A, we predict whether or not S will succeed in A-ing
through examination of his circumstances; we try to determine,
that is, if S has the opportunity to A. Similarly, if we are told S
has the ability and opportunity to A, we predict whether S will
A through consideration of the question of whether S is trying
to A. All of these tendencies to make inferences, and to identify
the crucial pieces of information needed to reach conclusions,
indicate a commitment, in our ordinary thinking, to (*).
Despite its attractions, J. L. Austin famously denied (*):
Consider the case where I miss a very short putt and kick myself because I
could have holed it. It is not that I should have holed it if I had tried: I did try,
and missed. It is not that I should have holed it had conditions been different:
that might of course be so, but I am talking about conditions as they precisely
were, and asserting that I could have holed it. There is the rub.25
In Austins example it would seem that the antecedent of (*)
is true, while the consequent false. However, this appearance
can be misleading. There is a sense in which the golfer who
misses has the ability and the opportunity and tries, but it is not
the sense invoked in the antecedent of (*). The golfer does not
differ in any way we can discern from the man who had the
ability to sink the putt; the golfers circumstances do not diﬀer
in any way we can discern from the man who had the oppor-
25 J. L. Austin, Ifs and Cans in Philosophical Papers, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979, pp. 205–232. See p. 218n.
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tunity to sink the putt; and nothing that we can discern distin-
guishes the golfers actions and eﬀorts from those of the man
who tried to sink the putt.26 This is the truth expressed by
someone who says that the golfer had the ability and oppor-
tunity and tried to sink the putt. And it is perfectly compatible
with (*), which implies that despite what we can discern, one of
those three conditions wasnt satisﬁed. Austin may have been
right that (*) is not embedded in the grammar of the term
‘‘can’’, a term which, itself, seems to straddle both ability and
opportunity; it seems to straddle, that is, both the properties of
the agent and his circumstances that make room for action. But
the truth expressed by (*) is not a truth about grammar, but a
truth about the metaphysics of agency.27
26 Compare Thomas Reid: ‘‘[A] being may have a power at one time
which it has not at another. It may commonly have a power, which, at a
particular time, it has not. Thus, a man may commonly have power to walk
or to run; but he has not this power when asleep, or when he is conﬁned by
superior force. In common language, he may be said to have a power which
he cannot then exert. But this popular expression means only that he
commonly has this power, and will have it when the cause is removed which
at present deprives him of it.’’ (Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of
Man, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969, p. 269.). Although Reid is discussing a
principle diﬀerent from (*) (hes discussing the principle that if a person has
the power to do something then he also has the power to exert that power)
his point would apply just as well to Austins example. Ordinary speech
might appear to allow for counterexamples where there are none in fact.
27 Austin adds the following remark which might be thought friendly to
the response to him that I am oﬀering here: ‘‘But if I tried my hardest, say,
and missed, surely there must have been something that caused me to fail,
that made me unable to succeed? So that I could not have holed it. Well, a
modern belief in science, in there being an explanation of everything, may
make us assent to this argument. But such a belief is not in line with tra-
ditional beliefs enshrined in the word can: according to them, a human
ability or power or capacity is inherently liable not to produce success, on
occasion, and that for no reason (or are bad luck and bad form sometimes
reasons?).’’ (Austin, Ifs and Cans, p. 218n) Austin could be taken to be
suggesting, here, that (*) has the same status as the principle of suﬃcient
reason. To be sure, a person can use the word ‘‘can’’, or the words ‘‘ability’’,
‘‘opportunity’’ and ‘‘try’’, without betraying a commitment to the principle
of suﬃcient reason. But, still, the principle of suﬃcient reason is true, and so
is (*).
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Although (*) can survive Austins criticism, it needs to be
interpreted carefully. In particular, the fact that acts take time
to perform has implications for how (*) should be interpreted.
The paradigm cases in which (*) seems to be true are those in
which the time for action is now and the action can be com-
pleted through nothing more than effort on the agents part to
complete the act now—raising ones hand or averting ones
eyes; in such cases it seems that effort on the agents part is
guaranteed to issue in action. But more complicated examples,
involving actions that require multiple steps to complete, seem
to invalidate (*). Say that I have the ability to ascend the
100-stair staircase, and I have the opportunity to do so, and I
try to do so; I ascend 50 stairs, at which point I simply change
my mind, turn around and return to the bottom. It seems that
there was a time, namely the time at which I took the ﬁrst step,
at which I had the ability to ascend to the top of the staircase,
the opportunity to do it, and tried to do it; and yet I did not do
it, neither then nor later. As described, the case is one in which I
am trying to do something at one moment in time that I stop
trying to do before the act is completed. We can also imagine
cases in which the agent has the ability to do something at one
moment and loses that ability before he has done that thing: at
the ﬁftieth stair my leg breaks. And we can imagine cases in
which it is opportunity which is lost before the act is completed:
at the ﬁftieth stair the entire staircase comes crashing down. Do
cases of these kinds show (*) to be false? No. They rather show
that (*) should be understood like so: say that A is an act that,
if it is to be performed, would begin at time t1 and be completed
at time t2. What is true is that an agent who has the ability and
the opportunity over the t1–t2 interval and tries to A over that
entire interval, As.28
When an agent tries to do something and then does it as a
result of the fact that he tried and in the appropriate way, the
completed act begins at precisely the moment that the agent
began to try to engage in the act. The act of ascending the
28 Put even more carefully: Where A is a type of action that can be
tokened over the t1-t2 time interval, (*) says the following: If (from t1 to t2
((S has the ability to A) & (S has the opportunity to A) & (S tries to A))),
then S will engage in a token of A over the t1-t2 interval.
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staircase begins at just the moment that the agent tries to
ascend the staircase, a trying that prompts him to raise his foot
to ascend the ﬁrst stair.29 Of course, we can try, fail and try
again and succeed. In such cases, the completed act begins
when the second trying—the trying that blossomed into suc-
cess—begins. What this implies is that it is not possible for an
agent to have the ability and opportunity to do something, and
try to do it, before the particular act in question begins.30 If the
agent is trying, then the act is beginning. What (*) says is that if
an agent with ability and opportunity is trying to do something,
then only one of three things can possibly prevent him from
doing it: he can lose the ability, he can lose the opportunity, or
he can change his mind and stop trying.
The concepts of ability, opportunity and trying are inter-
locking place-holder concepts. Ability is whatever it is (intrin-
sically) about an agent that ensures that she will act when she
has the opportunity and tries; opportunity is whatever it is
(intrinsically) about an agents circumstances that ensures that
she will act when she has the ability and tries; and trying is
whatever it is that an agent does that ensures that she will act
when she has the opportunity and ability. This implies that (*)
is not merely true, it is a necessary truth: every possible world in
which an agent with ability and opportunity tries to act is one
in which the agent acts. In making this claim, I am asserting
that there are only three kinds of things that can account for the
fact that an agent fails to act a certain way on a certain occa-
sion: it could be something about the agent, something about
29 A problematic example: Say I try to ascend the ﬁrst ﬁfty stairs, plan-
ning to decide when I get to step ﬁfty whether to continue to the top. When I
get to the ﬁftieth stair I decide to go ahead and thereby try to ascend the
staircase; I succeed in ascending the staircase. If my ascent of the staircase
began when I ascended the ﬁrst step, then it began before I tried to ascend
the staircase, for I didnt try to do that until Id reached the ﬁftieth stair.
However, it seems to me that this case should be described like so. The term
‘‘the ascent of the staircase’’ does not refer to a single act but instead to two
distinct acts that I performed: the act of ascending the ﬁrst ﬁfty stairs, and
the act of ascending the second ﬁfty. Each of those acts was begun at
precisely the moment I tried to perform it.
30 This is possible with respect to a type of act tokened later by an act that
begins later as a result of a later trying.
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his environment, or he could have failed to try. However, there
are difﬁcult cases. What should we say, for instance, about
failures that are explicable, at least in part, through appeal to
laws of nature? In fact, such failures are much more the rule
than the exception. A person who fails to leave a locked room,
after struggling with the door, fails to leave, in part, because of
the laws of physics: were the laws such that less force needed to
be applied to a steel lock to break it, the person would have left.
Should we characterize the laws of nature as part of the agents
circumstances, and thus eliminating his opportunity to act, or
should we, instead, say that whether or not the agents intrinsic
qualities (in our example, the strength of his muscles) qualify
as an ability to act depends on the laws? For our purposes,
it doesnt matter how this question is answered. The point is,
simply, that the laws must either eliminate the agents ability or
opportunity, or else must account for the fact that the agent
does not try to act. However we classify the laws—as ability-
undermining, opportunity-undermining or trying-undermining
(as it were)—our classiﬁcation presupposes that (*) is both true
and necessary.
Without saying what trying is, we can nonetheless say that,
when interpreted correctly, (*) is both true and necessary. This
provides us with a tool for determining if a particular agent S,
at a particular time t1, is trying to perform some act C that, if
completed, would be completed at time t2. To know if she is, we
need to know that the following counterfactual is true:
(**) If (1) from t1 to t2 S has the ability and the opportunity to C and (2) S
does not (at least until after t2) change his mind about doing any of the
things that he is doing at t1, then S would C.
This counterfactual must be true if C is among the things
that the agent is actually trying to do. In assessing this coun-
terfactual, we follow a multi-step process: First, we consider
possible worlds which are different from the actual in that
whatever it was about the agent or his circumstances that
accounts for his failure to act is different. In supplementing the
circumstances so as to make them such as to provide oppor-
tunity, we imagine, for instance, that Duke (the man who met
the undercover detective in a chat room, believing the detective
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to be a 12-year old girl) was not apprehended by police after
ﬂashing his lights, and we imagine that the person whom he
contacted in the chat room really was a 12-year old girl.31We
also supplement the defendants intrinsic properties so that they
amount to an ability to commit the crime. And we imagine that
these changes are stable from the time that concerns us (namely
t1) to the time at which the act would be completed (namely t2).
Second, taking the set of all the worlds that are so supple-
mented, we narrow our consideration to that subset in which
the defendant does not give up doing anything that hes started
at or before t1. In Dukes case, we consider all those worlds in
which he has ability and opportunity and says all the things in
the chat room that he actually said, drives to the parking lot
and ﬂashes his lights, as he actually did, and, most importantly,
continues to try to do all the things that he actually tried to do.
Third, we ask if, in that remaining set of worlds, the defendant
performs the crime. Since (*) is a necessary truth, failure to
perform the crime in any of those worlds is deﬁnitive of a
failure to actually try to act; and, conversely, performance of
the crime in all of those worlds is deﬁnitive of trying to commit
the crime.
That evidence of trying to act criminally is evidence of some
sense in which necessarily the agent would have done so had she
had ability and opportunity is the truth groped for, but not
grasped, by those who take the culpability-constituting feature
to which acts taken as means are supposed to attest to be res-
olute intention. The thought is that to be trying to act crimi-
nally it must not merely be the case that the defendant would
have acted had he not encountered obstacles, or not lacked the
ability; that might be true of the person who merely intends to
act that way. The thought is that we need more than just this,
we need more of a guarantee that the agent would really have
acted criminally had he had the ability and opportunity than we
have of the person with the criminal intention. The notion of
31 If Dukes intention was to molest an underage girl, then we supplement
his circumstances accordingly; it is not important that the girl be 12, but
only that she be underage. The point is that the content of the intention
dictates how we are to supplement the defendants circumstances and
intrinsic properties in assessing (**).
GIDEON YAFFE146
‘‘resolute’’ intention is supposed to provide that greater guar-
antee. But it provides it ineptly, for what is required is not
merely that the defendant who was really trying is that much
more likely to have acted criminally, had he had the ability and
opportunity; what is required is that necessarily he would have
acted criminally, under that condition.
The evidentialist justiﬁcation of the requirement of sub-
stantial steps would be aided by an argument for the following
general claim: If an agent took means to doing as she intended,
then there is evidence for thinking that (**) is true. If this is so,
then when an agent adopted means to doing as directed by her
criminal intention, we have reason to believe that shes trying to
act criminally. After all, what else besides trying to act could
combine with ability and opportunity so as to lead to action
with necessity? Or, to put the point a slightly different way, if
we have evidence that (**) is true, then we have evidence for
thinking that something the agent did was such as to link with
ability and opportunity in just the way in which trying to act so
links; something the agent did plays the same distinctive func-
tional role as trying to act. While this isnt decisive evidence
that the agent was trying to act criminally, it is very good
evidence for that, for it seems highly unlikely that anything
other than trying links with ability and opportunity in this way.
But what are acts performed as means to doing as one in-
tends evidence of? They are, at least, evidence that the defen-
dant was trying to perform those acts and was trying to perform
them as means; they are evidence, that is, that the defendant
tried to adopt means to furthering his criminal intention. The
defendant didnt just perform an act that was, in fact, a means
to C; he performed the act under the description, ‘‘a means to
C’’, or for the reason that the act was a means to C. Buying a
screwdriver might be a necessary means, on a certain occasion,
to killing someone with it. Of course, one can buy a screwdriver
for various innocent purposes, as well. However, if there is
evidence that a particular defendant bought the screwdriver for
the purpose of killing someone with it, then there is evidence that
the defendant was trying to undertake means to killing some-
one. This might not be the same as trying to kill someone, but,
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still, it is a ﬁrst step: when a person has performed a means,
there is evidence that he was trying to perform an act as a
means to furthering a criminal intention. So, whats required is
a link between trying to perform a means to C, on the one
hand, and trying to C, on the other. If we could show that its
necessarily the case that an agent who is trying to perform a
means is trying to perform the crime, then we would have
shown that acts taken as means are evidence of attempt. And if
we can then show that nothing other than trying to perform a
means could be necessarily connected with trying to act, then
we will have shown that nothing other than acts taken as means
could provide adequate evidence of attempt; and then we will
have justiﬁed the requirement of substantial steps on eviden-
tialist grounds.
Now consider the following argument: It is irrational for a
person who intends to perform an act, and who tries to take
some means to the action, to fail to try to perform the other acts
that he believes to be necessary means to it; such a person invests
himself in a course of conduct, expending energy and resources
to do so, but doesnt invest himself to the degree necessary to
reach his intended end. Thus, a rational person, intending
to reach an end, who tries to perform one means to it tries to
perform all necessary means to that end. But a person who tries
to perform all the necessary means to an end and also has the
ability and the opportunity to reach that end, will reach it. After
all, if he has the ability and opportunity to reach the end, he
must have the ability and opportunity to take all necessary
means. If he also tries to take those means, then he does all thats
necessary for reaching his end. If he nonetheless fails to do so, it
must be that he actually lacks the ability or opportunity, con-
trary to hypothesis. What this shows is that if we have evidence
suggesting that a person who intends to act criminally is trying
to take a means to the performance of the intended crime, we
thereby, ipso facto, have evidence that he would have completed
the crime had he had the ability and opportunity to do so. But
then, given (*), we have evidence for thinking that hes trying to
act criminally. What this shows is that actions taken as means to
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satisfying a criminal intention provide a very special form of
evidence that a rational defendant is trying to act criminally.
More formally, the argument just offered can be put like
this, where t1 is some time at or preceding the moment at which
crime C would be begun and t2 is the time at which C would be
completed:
1. If (at t1 ((S intends to C) & (S tries to M) & (S believes M to be a
means toC andperformsM for that reason)& (S is rational))), then
at t1 S tries to perform all the acts that are necessary means to C.
2. If ((at t1 S tries to performall the acts that are necessarymeans toC)
& (S has the ability and the opportunity to C from t1 until t2) &
(S doesnt change his mind before t2 and stop doing any of the
things that he is doing at t1)), then S Cs.
3. [from 1 and 2] If ((S intends to C) & (at t1 S tries to M) &
(S believes M to be a means to C and performs M for that reason)
& (S is rational) & (S has the ability and the opportunity to C) &
(S doesnt change his mind before t2 and stop doing any of the
things that he is doing at t1)), then S Cs.
4. If (**) is true, then S is trying to C
[ [from 3 and 4] If (at t1 ((S intends to C) & (S tries to M) &
(S believes M to be a means to C and performs M for that reason)
& (S is rational))), then at t1 S is trying to C.
If this argument succeeds, it brings usmuchof theway towards
supporting an evidentialist justiﬁcation of the requirement of
substantial steps. The conclusion says that a rational defendant
who has a criminal intention and was trying to adopt means to
doing as he intended, was indeed trying to commit the crime.
Further, if the premises of the argument are necessary truths
(which is still to be shown), and the conclusion follows from the
premises, then the conclusion is also a necessary truth. What this
shows is that at the very least satisfaction of the requirement of
substantial steps by a rational agent with a criminal intention is
sufﬁcient for trying to act criminally, even though acts taken as
means to doing as one intends are nothing more than evidence of
something else, namely of ones efforts to take such steps, efforts
which are guaranteed with necessity (in a rational agent) to be
found with an effort to complete the crime.
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As noted, the argument does not show, full stop, that the
agent who performs some means to doing as he intends is trying
to commit the crime. Rather, it shows that this is true of
rational defendants. Even assuming the argument is valid, does
this additional requirement undermine its import? So long as
the prosecution has the right to assume that the defendant is
rational, then the answer is ‘‘no’’. After all, assuming that the
prosecution has shown the defendant to have the required
criminal intention, what we need is a reason for thinking that in
showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant per-
formed an act he believed to be a means to doing as he
intended, the prosecution has thereby shown that the defendant
was trying to commit the crime. If the prosecution can assume
that the defendant is rational then the argument oﬀered here
gives us the reason we need. But does the prosecution have the
right to assume that the defendant is rational? At least one
reason why the prosecution has the right to assume this is that
all that we can hope to use as evidence of the defendants
mental state is the defendants behavior; but inferences from
behavior to mental states are mediated by a presumption of
rationality.32 Further, if the prosecution were required to
establish the defendants rationality prior to drawing inferences
about his mental states from his behavior, the prosecution
would have to have some means of providing evidence of his
mental states in order to show that those mental states com-
ported with the defendants behavior in the way a rational
agents mental states would. But this would require the prose-
cution to have some means of evidencing mental states distinct
from the behavior of the defendant; an evident circle.
Premise 1 requires some clariﬁcation. To understand premise 1,
it is important to distinguish between the following two claims:
(a) "m (m is a necessary means to C –> S tries to m).
32 Donald Davidson called this assumption the ‘‘principle of charity’’ or
sometimes the ‘‘principle of rational accommodation’’. See, for instance,
Donald Davidson, Radical Interpretation in Inquiries into Truth and
Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, pp. 125–140; and Three
Varieties of Knowledge in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2001, pp. 205–220.
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(b) S tries to perform the following act: performing all the acts that
are necessary means to C.
The consequent of premise 1 is (b), not (a). To see the dif-
ference between (a) and (b), consider an example33: Say that S
intends to rob a bank three months from now in New York.
Right now S is trying to book a plane ticket to New York. S
believes that booking the ticket is a necessary means to robbing
the bank. S also believes that opening the banks safe three
months from now is a necessary means to robbing the bank,
and this belief is true. And S is rational. It is manifest, however,
that S is not trying right now to open the safe; after all, right
now S is merely sitting at his computer browsing airline web-
sites. And lets stipulate that, in fact, S will never try to open the
safe: perhaps his plan will be foiled before he gets that far, or
perhaps hell give up his intention before the time to open the
safe arrives. Thus, in this case (a) is false. Since the conditions
speciﬁed in the antecedent of premise 1 are in place in this
example, it follows that premise 1 would be false if (a) were its
consequent. But notice that in the example (b) very well might
be true: the fact that S is not right now trying to open the safe
does not imply that he is not trying to perform all the acts
necessary to robbing the bank. If someone were to ask S if he
was trying to do everything necessary to rob the bank he might
very well say that he was and the fact that he is not right now
trying to open a safe would not invalidate his claim. Trying to
do, at a particular time, everything thats necessary doesnt
require trying to do, at that time, each of the individual acts
that are necessary. The point here is really no more than the
well-known point that co-referential action descriptions cannot
be substituted for one another in sentences while preserving the
truth values of those sentences; ‘‘is trying to —’’ is an opaque
context. The sentence ‘‘S is trying to do all that is necessary to
rob the bank’’ is true even though the sentence ‘‘S is trying to
open the banks safe’’ is false, and this is so despite the fact that
33 Thanks to Michael Bratman for the example, which he oﬀered, origi-
nally, as a counterexample to premise 1 when I had not yet formulated it in
such a way as to avoid the ambiguity noted here.
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among the acts S believes to be necessary to robbing the bank is
the opening of the safe.
What this implies is that premise 1 is not a claim to the effect
that a rational person who is trying to take one step towards
doing what he intends is thereby committed to not changing his
mind. Premise 1 would have that implication if (a) were its
consequent. But, since (b) is its consequent, premise 1 has no
implications whatsoever for what the rational agent will do
after time t1, the time at which he is trying to undertake means
to doing as he intends. Premise 1 can be thought of as a
coherence constraint on the set of things which a rational agent
is trying to do at a particular time. Just as it would be irrational
for an agent to try to A while, at the same time, trying to refrain
from A, it would be irrational for an agent to try to undertake a
necessary means without also trying to undertake all the nec-
essary means.
The success of the argument being offered turns on premises
1 and 2; if the argument is to succeed, both must be true, and
both must be necessary truths. To see why premise 1 is true,
consider, ﬁrst, what the purpose of trying is. That is, consider
what good is served by our being agents that have the capacity
to try to do things. After all, it is a contingent fact that we do
have that capacity. Its possible to engage in purposive behav-
ior, end-directed behavior, without ever trying to do anything.
Perhaps bees do this. Bees are not architects; they do not frame
a conception of the hive before they build it and endeavor to
bring it about that the world matches their conception of it. Yet
they build hives. But human beings do this. We dont just plan;
we also execute our plans. And the execution of our plans is
itself an exercise of agency. Our plans dont simply translate
themselves into conduct. Instead, we try to do as our plans
direct. The point of trying is acting; we are trying creatures
precisely because we are not the sort of creatures who, in many
aspects of life anyway, will pursue ends except by actively doing
so. Given the sorts of creatures we are, we need to have the
capacity to try to do things if we are to reach our ends. What
this suggests is that trying is an activity that is governed by
certain norms of instrumental rationality. To be trying to do
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something is to be subject to norms that, in general, need to be
obeyed if one is to thereby succeed in acting. To take the
obvious example already mentioned above: an agent who is
trying to A is irrational if he is also trying to refrain from A-ing.
The reason is because, generally, an agent who both tries to act
and tries to refrain fails to act; since the point of trying to act is
to act, an agent whose tryings are inconsistent in this way is
irrational.
To reach premise 1, however, we need more than this. We
need to show that the point of trying is generally undermined
when an agent tries to take a means to an end without also
trying to take all means to that end. What is the point of trying
to take a means to an end? Part of the point is to, in fact, take
that means. One of the goods that is served by trying to pull a
trigger is that one, thereby, pulls the trigger. But the point of
trying to do something under the description ‘‘a means to an
end’’ is not just to do it; it is also to reach the end. Thus an
agent who tries to take a means to an end—who endeavors, for
instance, to pull a trigger not simply because he would be
pulling a trigger, but also because pulling a trigger is one step in
a course of conduct that he hopes will culminate in him killing
another person—is under rational pressure to do all those
things that he believes to be necessary to reach the end. But if
hes under rational pressure to do these things, he is also under
rational pressure to try to do them. Premise 1 follows: a ra-
tional agent who performs one act as a means to his end tries to
perform all the necessary means to his end. Since the argument
for premise 1 just offered is purely conceptual, it follows that
premise 1 is necessary.
To establish premise 2, wemust ﬁrst head off an objection that
seems to show it to be false: Say that a person has false beliefs
about what the necessary means are to reaching his end; he be-
lieves, for instance, that he can kill his boss by sticking pins in a
voodoo doll. No amount of trying to do that is going to result in
his killing his boss, even if he does have the ability and oppor-
tunity to kill him by, say, shooting him. Since what, precisely, a
person who is trying to undertake all necessary means to an end
directs himself towards doing depends on what he believes the
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necessarymeans to his end to be—in our example, themanwould
direct himself towards sticking pins in a doll, not towards pulling
a trigger—premise 2 is false of any agent with false beliefs about
what means are necessary to doing as he intends. However, what
this objection overlooks is that false beliefs can undermine ones
abilities. False beliefs about what constitutes necessary means to
an end can undermine ones ability to reach that end; hence,
under the supposition that the agent has the ability to reach the
end, we must imagine, also, that he does not have such radically
false beliefs about what means are necessary as to prevent him
from adopting the acts that are, in fact, necessary means.34
The positive argument for premise 2 appeals to the concepts of
ability and opportunity. It is obviously not always the case that
performance of all the necessary means to an end is sufﬁcient for
reaching it: there might be some obstacle to reaching the end that
the agent cannot hope to evade.However, in such a case the agent
lacks either the ability or the opportunity to reach the end: if the
obstacle derives fromhis lacking the appropriate properties, then
he lacks the ability; if it derives from something in his circum-
stances, then he lacks the opportunity. However, if an agent has
the ability and the opportunity to reach the end and yet fails to
reach it must be because he didnt do one of the things that was
necessary to reaching it; there must have been some necessary
means that he failed to adopt. But if he tried to adopt thatmeans,
and yet failed, itmust be because he lacked either the ability or the
opportunity to adopt it. But if he lacked either of those, then he
lacked the ability or opportunity to reach his end, contrary to
hypothesis. Premise 2 follows, and, as in the case of premise 1, the
34 Down this road lies an argument against criminalizing a certain class of
radically impossible attempts. Someone who intends to kill someone while
believing that voodoo will do the trick has beliefs that actually undermine
his ability to reach the end by undermining his ability to perform acts that
are actually likely to lead to completion of the crime; his beliefs commit him
to using what resources he has on acts other than those that are actually
necessary for doing as he intends. In such a case, possible worlds in which
the agent has the ability to complete the crime are possible worlds in which
he doesnt undertake the very acts that are to be construed as his substantial
steps.
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argument for it appeals only to the concepts invoked. What fol-
lows is that premise 2, also, is a necessary truth.
So, to summarize, acts taken as means provide evidence that
the defendant, if he was rational, was trying to perform a means
to the crime. The function of trying—namely, to lead to ac-
tion—places a constraint on the set of things that a rational agent
who is trying to perform ameans to commit the crime is trying to
do: he also tries to performall the acts that are necessarymeans to
committing it. But an agent who is trying to undertake that
act—the act of performing every necessary means—and who has
the ability and the opportunity to commit the crime, will commit
it. It follows that substantial steps provide evidence for thinking
that the agentwould have committed the crime had he ability and
opportunity and did not change his mind; they provide evidence
for thinking (**) true. This is the mark of trying. Thus, steps
taken as means to doing as speciﬁed by ones criminal intention
provide evidence that the defendantwas, in fact, trying to commit
the crime. Since it is precisely that that we are criminalizing in
criminalizing attempts, acts taken as means provide precisely the
kind of evidence we need to justify conviction.
Recall that in the last section it was argued that while acts
taken as means are construed as evidence of the culpability-
constituting features of the completed crime, we lack an adequate
justiﬁcation of the requirement of substantial steps. The primary
problem is that other things besides acts taken as means would
serve as adequate evidence of those features and so it seemed that
there was no acceptable justiﬁcation for constraining the evi-
dential route through which the defendants guilt is to be estab-
lished in the way that the requirement of substantial steps does.
Does the proposed explanation for the evidential import of acts
taken as means evade this concern? Yes. To see this, ﬁrst imagine
that some other fact F, distinct from the undertaking of a means
M to the commission of the crime C, could provide evidence that
the defendant was trying to M. F, then, would have to provide
evidence that an instance of (**) is true; F would have to provide
evidence, that is, that the agent would have performedM had he
had, over the appropriate time interval, the ability and oppor-
tunity andnot changedhismind. So, the questionofwhatF could
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be is just the questionwithwhich this sectionbegan, namely,what
fact could serve as evidence that a person is trying to do some-
thing?35 So the argument oﬀered above for thinking that a person
who is trying to undertake a means will succeed in reaching the
end should he have ability andopportunity, cannot help someone
who thinks that something other than acts taken as means could
serve as evidence that a defendant is trying to commit the crime;
such a person would still have to explain how there could be
evidence of trying to act that didnt just amount to the taking of
steps.
So, if something distinct from acts taken as means is to
provide the same sort of evidence that substantial steps provide
it must do so by providing evidence of something other than the
trying to take means. And this other thing, whatever it is, must
be assured with necessity to issue in action in an agent who has
the ability and opportunity to commit the crime and does not
change his mind over the relevant time interval. Its hard to
imagine what this other thing could be if it is not another
trying, a trying distinct from the trying to commit the crime.
What else would intersect with ability and opportunity so as to
necessitate action? If it is a trying distinct from the trying to
commit the crime, then it would need to be linked to trying to
commit the crime by virtue of the very concept of trying, as the
trying to take means is so linked. But it seems unlikely that any
other trying besides the trying to take means could be so linked.
So, it seems that the crucial thing that we need to know when
asking ourselves if an agent is trying to commit a crime is
whether or not he was trying to take means to do so; and it
seems that the only evidence we can hope to have that he was
trying to do so is his actually doing so. Thus substantial steps
dont merely provide the kind of evidence we need, it also seems
very unlikely that anything else could provide the evidence we
need.
35 If F serves as evidence that the agent is trying to perform some means
N to M, then it also serves as evidence that the agent is trying to perform C,
since N is, necessarily, a means to C, given that it is a means to M and M is a
means to C. But in that case, still, in meeting the need for evidence that the
defendant is trying to C, the requirement of substantial steps is itself met.
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Its important to explain how the solution proposed here dif-
fers from one of those rejected in section 1. Recall the proposal
discussed in section 1 according to which the requirement of
substantial steps is justiﬁed since trying is not merely a mental
state but necessarily includes some kind of action in furtherance
of the agents aim. Thus, according to this view, since it is justiﬁed
to criminalize attempts it is ipso facto justiﬁed to require that the
guilty defendant has taken some means to doing as he intends.
This approach was rejected on the grounds that the very problem
that the criminalization of attempts was supposed to solve—it
was supposed to provide for equal treatment of citizens who do
not diﬀer morally and whom there is no good reason to treat
diﬀerently—was simply reintroduced. If trying necessarily in-
volves action, and if what actions an agent performs frequently
involves luck, then we should solve the problem of inequality not
by criminalizing attempts, but by criminalizing something less
than attempt that is nonetheless morally just as bad as the com-
pleted crime.
The view presented in this section does not require us to deny
that trying necessarily includes action; in fact, it is probably true.
But nor does the view presented here appeal to that fact in jus-
tifying the requirement of substantial steps. That is, according to
the view presented here, the requirement of substantial steps is
justiﬁed because the taking of means is probably the only good
evidence we can have of trying to take means, and trying to take
means is, given an allowable presumption of rationality, sufﬁ-
cient for trying to act criminally.Now it is possible that the taking
ofmeans is a component of trying to act criminally; perhaps there
is nomore to trying to act criminally than intending to and taking
some means. But that fact plays no role in the justiﬁcation of the
requirement of substantial steps. Or, to put the crucial point in a
diﬀerent way, someone who appeals to the fact that trying in-
cludes action in order to justify the requirement of substantial
steps cannot explain why the criminalization of attempts, given
the denial of moral luck, doesnt result in morally equivalent
people being treated diﬀerently by the state for no good reason;
somepeople fail to act on their criminal intentions simply because
of luck. But the view on oﬀer can explain this. The diﬀerence
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between those who fail to act on their criminal intentions and
those who do act on them is that the latter, and not the former,
provide uswith the only kindof evidence thatwe canhope tohave
of their morally objectionable eﬀorts. Since it is justiﬁed to treat
defendants diﬀerently when we have diﬀerent evidence of their
guilt, the requirement of substantial steps is justiﬁed even if such
defendants do not diﬀer morally.
V. A SPECULATIVE SUGGESTION ABOUT INSUBSTANTIAL
STEPS
In the ﬁrst section of this paper I eluded to a famous problem
faced by judges and legislators in their efforts to draw lines
between those who attempt crimes, on the one hand, and, on
the other, those who intend to act criminally, perform some
acts that are necessary to doing as they intend, but who do less
than is needed for attempt. The problem is ordinarily framed as
one of deciding whether the defendants actions were merely
preparatory or, instead, constituted substantial steps towards
performance of the crime. Was Dukes act of driving to the
parking lot and ﬂashing his lights a substantial step towards
performing the sexual battery he intended, or was it less than
that? This sections offers a word about the implications for this
issue of the evidentialist justiﬁcation of the requirement of
substantial steps defended here. Since theres a question as to
whether the commonsense notion of ‘‘merely preparatory’’ acts
maps precisely on to the category of ‘‘insubstantial steps’’—acts
taken as means to doing as one intends but which are insufﬁ-
cient for the act element of attempt—I will be using the term
‘‘insubstantial steps’’ and will be asking how the line is to be
drawn between substantial and insubstantial steps.
The argument offered in Section 3 implies that any act
undertaken as a means to an intended act constitutes an indis-
pensable form of evidence to the eﬀect that the agent is trying to
perform the act he intends to perform.Acts expressive of criminal
intention—such as verbal reports of ones intention—are not,
ordinarily, undertaken as means to doing as one intends, and so
such acts do not constitute the kind of evidence of attempt that
acts undertaken as means provide; this is why they do not count
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as substantial steps. However, acts expressive of intention are
not, ordinarily, even insubstantial steps. Ordinarily, one does
not need to express ones intent in order to do as one intends
(exceptions are cases in which other agents need to know what
one intends if they are to do their part in aiding one to accomplish
ones intention). Thus, while we so far have an explanation for
why acts expressive of intent do not amount to substantial steps,
that same explanation does not extend immediately to explain
why there are any insubstantial steps. Why isnt any act per-
formed as a means to doing as one intends enough for the act
element of attempt?
Perhaps the right response is that there are no insubstantial
steps. In effect, to offer this response is to defend the ‘‘First
Act’’ test under which a defendant has taken a substantial step
just in case he has taken any step, has adopted any act as a
means to doing as speciﬁed by his criminal intention. It is
possible that this is correct. It is also possible that although the
justiﬁcation of the requirement of substantial steps does not
rule out the approach implied by adopting the First Act test,
there might be other independent reasons to prefer an approach
that allows for some acts to be insubstantial steps. Perhaps, that
is, there are reasons other than their evidential value for taking
some acts taken as means to be insufﬁcient for the act element
of attempt. This also might be correct, and nothing in the
argument offered so far suggests that it is not.
However, the argument of the last section of this paper does
not force one to choose between these two options; theres a
third. To see this, distinguish between the following two claims:
(a) Performing an act that is a means to doing as one intends is
evidence of trying to perform that means.
(b) Performing an act under the description ‘‘a means to doing as I
intend’’ is evidence of trying to perform that act.
Claim (a) is thrown into some doubt, although perhaps not
invalidated, by cases in which agents perform acts that are means
to doing as they intend, but who dont perform them for that
reason, or under that description. Say that a man intends to
commit murder using a screwdriver; he purchases a screwdriver.
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His purchasing the screwdriver, lets stipulate, is necessary for
him to do as he intends and is, in fact, ameans to his doing so. But
that doesnt mean that thats why he buys the screwdriver; he
might buy it towork on his car. This doesnt show that (a) is false,
for his buying the screwdriver might be evidence of his trying to
take a means to killing someone with a screwdriver, even if it is
defeasible evidence. Still, if it is shown that he buys the screw-
driver for the reason that doing so is a means to killing someone
with it—if it is shown that he performs the act under the
description ‘‘ameans to doing as I intend’’—then that is far better
evidence, perhaps even undefeasible evidence, that he is trying to
undertake a means to doing as he intends. Heres the point: The
argument of the last section of this paper showed that any act
performed as a means to doing as one intends constitutes dis-
tinctive evidence that the defendant is trying to commit the crime.
But it does not show that performing any act that is a means to
doing as one intends constitutes such evidence; some acts that are
means are better evidence that the agent is trying to take means
than others, for there can be varying degrees of evidence that the
agent is performing the act under the description ‘‘a means to
doing as I intend’’.
Perhaps, then, the substantial/insubstantial step distinction
can be drawn by appeal to the degree to which the fact that the
agent took an act that is a means to doing as he intends pro-
vides evidence that he was trying to take a means. In particular,
perhaps the distinction should be drawn like so, where M is a
means to doing as S intends:
M is a substantial step if and only if The fact that S performed M provides
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that S tried to take a means to C.
Under this suggested criterion, the fact that an act furthered
more than one of the defendants intentions—the fact that
buying the screwdriver served both his end of ﬁxing his car and
his end of killing another person—could provide a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not the defendant was trying to perform
a means to doing as speciﬁed by his criminal intention. Such a
doubt would then undermine the claim that the purchase of the
screwdriver was a substantial step precisely because it would
undermine the claim that the defendant was trying to take a
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means to doing something criminal, and so would undermine
the claim that he was trying to commit the crime in question.
And, perhaps other things besides multiple reasons of this sort
could also provide such reasonable doubt.
I am not entirely certain that this criterion for distinguishing
substantial and insubstantial steps will survive scrutiny. The
point for our purposes, however, is just this: since there is a
difference between performing an act that is a means to doing
as you intend, on the one hand, and performing an act as a
means to doing as you intend, on the other, the argument of the
last section allows room to distinguish among acts taken as
means and so it neither commits one to the First Act test, nor to
rejecting that test on grounds that do not appeal to the evi-
dential value of acts that are means to doing as speciﬁed by the
defendants criminal intention. Some of those acts have greater
evidential import than others for some evidence the fact that
the defendant is trying to take means, and others do not.
VI. CONCLUSION
The elements of crimes are treated by the law as constitutive of
those crimes; they are treated as necessary, and not just causally
necessary, for performance of the crime. This is what makes an
evidentialist justiﬁcation of the requirement of substantial steps
difﬁcult, for acts undertaken asmeans are an element of the crime
of attempt, and evidence is, except in rare cases,merely correlated
with that which it is evidence of; evidence is not ordinarily nec-
essary for the fact that it evidences. But the case of attempt, the
case of trying, is not ordinary in this regard. Undertaking means
to an intended act is evidence of trying to undertake such means,
and a rational agents trying to undertake means is sufﬁcient for
trying to perform the intended act. The requirement of sub-
stantial steps is justiﬁed precisely because of the evidence that
substantial steps provide; in this case, the evidence is so closely
related to the fact that it evidences, that it makes sense for the law
to treat it as an element of the crime. And it is because this is so
that the requirement of substantial steps can be justiﬁed even
by those who deny that there is moral luck. Those, then, who
deny moral luck should be happy with the standard doctrine of
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criminal attempt; it enshrines in lawdeep features of our ordinary
conception of trying anddoes so in awaywhich is consonantwith
the thought that there can be no moral difference where there is
only a lucky difference.36
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